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The Holy Lance of Antioch: Power, Devotion 
and Memory on the First Crusade 
Thomas Asbridge 
Queen Mary, University of London 
In the early summer of 1098 a rough conglomeration of armed 
pilgrim groups from north and south Francia, the Low Countries, 
the Rhineland and southern Italy - what, today, historians would 
usually describe as the First Crusade - found itself on the brink of 
annihilation, thousands of miles from home, in northern Syria. 
Having prosecuted a gruelling eight-month siege of Antioch, these 
disparate Latin forces finally broke into the city on 3 June and 
rampaged through its streets. They failed, however, to capture 
Antioch's citadel and, on 4 June, advance scouts from a huge 
Muslim relief army, led by Kerbogha of Mosul, reached the city. 
In a bizarre reversal of fortune the Franks now found themselves 
besieged within the city. 
In the weeks that followed the First Crusaders reached their 
lowest ebb. Trapped within Antioch, they were surrounded and 
outnumbered perhaps four to one. Within days of his arrival, 
Kerbogha began using the citadel as a staging post from which to 
launch a series of frontal assaults on the city below, prompting the 
most sustained and intense fighting of the entire crusade. Terrified 
and exhausted Franks began to desert, among them William of 
Grandmesnil, brother-in-law to the crusade leader Bohemond of 
Taranto. Those who remained faced starvation in a city already 
denuded of resources. I The crusaders had experienced food 
shortages before, but this was a new, extreme form of famine, one 
in which the poor began to eat their shoes and it was feared that 
some might resort to cannibalism 2 
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This 'second siege' of Antioch was the worst crisis of the First 
Crusade. Immobilised by fear and starvation, with morale 
crumbling, the Franks were brought to the brink of defeat. But 
somehow the crusaders survived and ultimately prevailed. By 28 
June 1098, they had elected to face Kerbogha in open battle and, 
on that day, won a seemingly miraculous victory, routing the 
Muslim army and taking full, uncontested possession of Antioch.3 
To date, historians have looked to the unearthing of a relic of the 
Holy Lance on 14 June 1098 to explain this dramatic change in 
fortunes, arguing that the Lance's discovery transformed the 
crusaders' state of mind, acting as a unifying and empowering 
catalyst to action.4 This article challenges that interpretation, 
making a case for a careful. re-examination of the accepted 
narrative of Antioch's second siege and for a reassessment of the 
impact and significance of the Holy Lance. 5 
The context of the Holy Lance's discovery 
On 10 June, an otherwise unknown Provenyal peasant named 
Peter Bartholomew was admitted to a private meeting with Bishop 
Adhemar of Le Puy, the papal legate on the crusade, and Count 
Raymond of Toulouse, de facio leader of the southern French 
crusaders6 In the interview that followed Peter stated that, since 
30 December 1097, he had experienced five separate visions ofSt 
Andrew the Apostle (accompanied by another figure, later 
revealed to be Christ), the last of which had occurred that same 
day. Peter asserted that, in the course of these visions, St Andrew 
had revealed that the Holy Lance was buried in the Basilica of St 
Peter in Antioch. According to Christian tradition, this Lance was 
the spear, wielded by the Roman soldier Longinus, that pierced 
Jesus' body at his crucifixion. St Andrew instructed that this relic 
should be unearthed by the crusaders and used as a standard 
because 'he who carries this lance in battle shall never be 
overcome by the enemy'. The Apostle also appears to have 
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specified that the Lance should be given to Raymond of Toulouse 
as 'God set it aside for him at birth'. Peter stated that, up until 
now, he had been too frightened to reveal this story, even though 
St Andrew had repeatedly returned to reprimand him for his 
silence. But, with the crusade on the edge of collapse, he had at 
last come forward. 7 
Initially, reactions to Peter's story seem to have varied. 
Adhemar, we are told, 'thought the tale untrue', while Count 
Raymond 'believed it at once and placed Peter Bartholomew in 
the custody of his chaplain, Raymond,.8 This latter Raymond was 
Raymond of Aguilers, who wrote a narrative account of the First 
Crusade soon after 1101. He was the key source for Peter 
Bartholomew's interview on j() June and for the entire history of 
the Holy Lance, as well as a passionate advocate of the relic 's 
significance and authenticity. Given all the above, Raymond's 
testimony has the advantage of his afparent proximity to events, 
tempered by his marked partisanship. 
In light of Raymond of Aguiler's perspective, it is interesting 
that he chose so clearly to record Adhemar's doubts about Peter's 
visions. In the eleventh century, the constituent elements of 
Peter's story - the appearance of apparitions, revelations about 
sacred relics - would not, in of themselves, have been viewed as 
fantastical or improbable. Instead, the bishop's caution was 
probably, at least in part, a consequence of Peter's low social 
status. As a senior cleric, it was, after all, his responsibility to 
validate carefully the authenticity of visions, miracles and relics. 
An important litmus test in assessing putative instances of spiritual 
experience or divine intervention was the willingness of a 
visionary or witness to confirm the veracity of their experience 
with a sacred oath. And, although Peter apparently 'swore the 
whole story was quite true', his oath as a peasant likely carried 
less weight than that of a cleric or nobleman. lo A further area of 
concern for Adhemar may have been the existence of another relic 
of the Holy Lance in the relic collection of the Byzantine Emperor 
in Constantinople, a relic which the bishop may himself have seen 
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1097. Greek tradition held that St Helena had discovered the 
Lance in Jerusalem in the fourth century and that this relic was 
later brought to Constantinople. Even so, the existence of this 
Constantinopolitan relic would not necessarily have negated the 
possibility of an Antiochene relic of the Lance, as Adhemar would 
have been accustomed to the idea that relics were often fragments 
of a whole object, rather than the whole object itself. I I 
Putting aside Adhemar's scepticism for the moment, we 
can be certain that the basic notion of an efficacious sacred relic 
would have been familiar and attractive to the First Crusaders. 
Indeed, it has long been recognised that in common with much of 
eleventh-century western European society, the Franks who set 
out to reconquer the Holy Land. were deeply fascinated by relics. 
Many brought sacred objects with them on their journey: Bishop 
Adhemar himself carried a piece of the True Cross, while 
Raymond of Toulouse took a chalice that had once belonged to the 
celebrated holy man Robert of Chaise-Dieu. The Latins also 
picked up numerous relics in the course of the crusade. Robert 
count of Flanders, for example, became a devotee of St George 
after a priest in his army stole a relic of the saint's arm from a 
Byzantine monastery on route to the Holy Land. 12 
By June 1098, the First Crusaders were also becoming 
accustomed to the idea that 'miraculous' interventions, 
supernatural forces and celestial portents were affecting the course 
of their expedition. Raymond of Aguilers described how two 
knights in 'shining armour' appeared at the battle of Dorylaeum 
on I July 1097 to fight alongside the Franks; how 'God increased 
the size' of the Latin forces in the battle against Ridwan of Aleppo 
on 9 February 1098; and how a miraculous rain filled the moat 
surrounding the siege fort of La Mahomerie in March of that same 
year. 13 
Moreover, when Peter Bartholomew came forward on 10 June 
1098, the crusade app,ears to have been entering a period of 
intensified spirituality. 4 Peter may have asserted that he had been 
experiencing supernatural visitations since December 1097, but 
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his declaration of these events in June marked the first recorded 
instance of visionary activity on the expedition. It is, perhaps, not 
surprising that under the intense pressure of the second siege of 
Antioch apparitions became more common. Raymond of Aguilers 
noted in mid-June that 'now reported revelations of our comrades 
became rife,.15 He described how, on II June, a priest named 
Stephen of Valence announced that he had experienced a vision in 
which Christ and the Virgin Mary scolded the crusaders for their 
sinful ways and ordered them to undergo five days of 
purificational purgation. According to Raymond, Stephen then 
'swore upon the cross to verify it, and finally signified his 
willingness to cross through fire or throw himself from the heights 
of a tower if necessary to convince the unbelievers.'1 6 It is 
interesting that to note that even a priest like Stephen, who had 
sworn an oath, felt compelled to offer to undergo an ordeal to 
authenticate his story.17 
The impact of the discovery of the Holy Lance 
On 14 June 1098 southern French crusaders began searching for 
the Holy Lance in the Basilica of St Peter. This appears to have 
been a carefully orchestrated event, possibly instigated by 
Raymond of Toulouse, because we are informed that 'all other 
Christians' were expelled from the church before a select group of 
thirteen men, including Peter Bartholomew, Count Raymond 
himself, the bishop of Orange and Raymond of Aguilers, began to 
dig.18 Alive to the Lance's potential significance should it indeed 
be found and encouraged by Peter Bartholomew's apparent 
willingness to associate the relic with him definitively, the count 
seems to have been keen to control the environment in which the 
search took place, and thus prevent accusations of outside 
interference and acquire the kudos attached to any discovery. 
Perhaps Raymond envisioned a rather theatrical set piece 
excavation, in which he would be closely, even physically, 
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involved in the moment of unearthing, but this was not to be. The 
digging continued all day long 'to a depth of two men ' s stature' 
without any success, prompting some to lose heart. 19 Raymond of 
Toulouse himself left the Basilica, apparently to help guard the 
citadel, but perhaps in part to distance himself from what might 
prove to be a fruitless hunt. In the evening fresh replacements 
were brought in to continue the work, but still nothing was found , 
Raymond of Aguilers to record that: 
The youthful Peter Bartholomew, seeing the exhaustion 
of our workers, stripped his outer garments and, clad only 
in a shirt and barefooted, dropped into the hole. He then 
begged us to pray to God 10 return His Lance to the 
crusaders so as to bring strength and victory to His 
people. Finally, in His mercy, the lord showed us his 
Lance and I, Raymond, the author of this book, kissed the 
point of the Lance as it barely protruded from the 
ground 2o 
There can be little doubt that, to start with at least, most of the 
First Crusaders accepted the authenticity of Peter' s discovery. 
Bishop Adhemar may still have had his misgivings, but, as Colin 
Morris has shown, there is no definitive evidence to indicate that, 
at this stage at least, any of the princes aired suspicions?1 The 
discovery of the Holy Lance does seem to have had a positive 
effect on the Frankish army's morale. In his second letter to 
Manasses, written in July 1098, Anselm of Ribemont described 
how this 'precious pearl revived the hearts of all our men'. The 
letter composed by the citizens of Lucca in October 1098, but 
based on recollections of the First Crusader Bruno of Lucca, who 
appears to have left the siege of Antioch in mid-July, described 
the relic as a divine 'favour' and noted that after its unearthing the 
crusaders 'rejoiced and magnified the mercy of God'. Raymond of 
Aguilers wrote of 'the happiness [".J which filled Antioch', while 
the author of the Gesla Francorum recalled that, 'throughout all 
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the city there was boundless rejoicing'. This positive reaction does 
not appear to have been confined to Latin Christian crusaders, as 
Peter Tudebode noted that a 'great euphoria seized the city' as 
Antioch's indigenous Greek, Armenian and Syrian populace 
likewise celebrated?2 
Modern historiography has been dominated by the view that 
the Lance's discovery had a transformative effect upon the 
crusaders' spirits. The unearthing of such an extraordinarily 
powerful relic, it has been argued, coming at the very moment at 
which the crusade seemed to face certain destruction, was 
interpreted by many Latins as an irrefutable indication of God's 
renewed support for the expedition. John France, for example, 
wrote that the Lance and the viSions associated with it 'profoundly 
improved the depressed morale of the crusader army,?3 Numerous 
historians have gone yet further, positing a clear connection 
between the Lance's discovery and the events that followed. Hans 
Eberhard Mayer, for example, suggested that, 'the immediate 
effects of the discovery [of the Lance 1 were enormous. The 
armies' morale was raised and all were united in the determination 
to break the blockade and destroy Kerbogha'. Jonathan Riley-
Smith similarly argued that the reaction to the relic ' was an 
important element in the decision to sortie out of Antioch and 
engage Kerbogha's force,24 The widely accepted notion that the 
advent of the Holy Lance directly inspired the First Crusaders to 
seek to resolve the second siege of Antioch through a pitched 
battle with Kerbogha has had significant consequences for our 
understanding of the expedition. First, it has marked the 
unearthing of the Lance as a pivotal moment in the fortunes of the 
crusade. Secondly, it has fostered the impression that the crusaders 
were possessed by an ecstatic and impassioned form of spiritual 
piety, one powerful enough to drive them to face seemingly 
suicidal odds in battle. 
Although the Lance's discovery does appear to have had an 
effect on crusader morale, the degree and significance of its 
impact have, to date, been exaggerated. This article argues that 
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there was no direct, unbroken link between the unearthing of the 
Lance and the decision to fight Kerbogha, and that, in fact , the 
crusaders may actually have sought to surrender before 28 June 
1098. It also suggests that the notion that the Holy Lance had 
acted as an all-empowering catalyst only truly took hold in the 
crusaders' minds after 28 June as the cult of veneration 
surrounding the relic developed, and that, therefore, the wider 
influence of the story of the Lance upon medieval conceptions of 
the First Crusade's progress and the very ideal of crusading were 
dependent, at least in part, upon a construction or collectivisation 
of memory. 
To some extent, the current consensus on the impact of the 
Holy Lance is grounded in a. reasoned examination of the 
evidence. Historians believe that the crusaders were directly 
inspired to act by the Holy Lance because that is what our 
knowledge of contemporary attitudes towards relics would lead us 
to expect and what many of the primary sources for the First 
Crusade tell us. 
Beyond the contemporary obsession with relics referenced 
above, there are more precise comparators to the role of, and 
reception of, the Holy Lance. These demonstrate that Latin 
Christians would have been acculturated to the notion that a relic 
might playa role in military affairs and, more precisely, influence 
the outcome of a battle, campaign or expedition 25 Of course, in 
seeking to accurately gauge the Lance's impact we are hampered 
by the fact that all the primary sources relating to its discovery 
were written after the battle of Antioch on 28 June 1098. On 11 
September 1098, the crusader princes stated in a letter to the pope 
that: 'We were so comforted and strengthened by [the Lance's] 
discovery and by so many other divine revelations that some of us 
who had been discouraged and fearful beforehand, then became 
courageous and resolute to fight, and encouraged each other.'26 
The Gesla Francorum corroborated this story in a passage that has 
served to define the way we think about the Holy Lance. An 
eyewitness account of the crusade, written by a southern Italian 
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Norman follower of Bohemond, the Gesla acted as the template 
for many of the narratives of the expedition that were 
subsequently written in the twelfth century, making its version of 
events hugely influential?' Its anonymous author described the 
unearthing of the Holy Lance and then went on immediately to 
note that' from that hour we decided on a plan of attack, and all 
our leaders forthwith held a council. ,28 These words prompt the 
reader to imagine that the crusaders made an immediate decision 
to fight Kerbogha and to expect that the battle of Antioch must 
have followed hard on the heels of the Lance's discovery. But the 
Gesla Francorum's account of these events is misleading. The 
Holy Lance was discovered on 14 June 1098, but it was two 
weeks before the crusaders went into battle on 28 June. How can 
this often overlooked hiatus be explained?29 
The two-week delay 
No evidence survives to indicate that the crusaders were actively 
prevented from initiating military action against their Muslim 
besiegers between 14 and 28 June. According to Raymond of 
Aguilers, Peter Bartholomew received a new visitation from St 
Andrew and Christ during the night of 15-16 June, prompting him 
to recommend that all Franks 'turn from sin to God and offer five 
alms because of the five wounds of the Lord' and that the 
discovery of the Lance should be commemorated on 21 June. 
Alms do appear to have been collected, but no evidence survives 
regarding Peter's projected celebration of the Lance.3o 
It seems highly unlikely that the delay was the result of 
military necessity. For one thing, past precedent showed that the 
Franks did not need two weeks to prepare for a battle; they had, 
after all, defeated the relief army led by Ridwan of Aleppo in 
February 1098 with just a few days' warning. 31 And any decision 
to delay battle, were it deliberate, would have been deeply ill 
advised, given that the First Crusaders were now in the grip of the 
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worst famine experienced during their campaign, with each 
passing day more gravely eroding military resources in terms of 
32 
manpower and cavalry mounts. 
It is possible that the Latin command structure was crippled in 
late June by a leadership contest, one triggered or exacerbated by 
Raymond of Toulouse's recently conferred status as patron of the 
Holy Lance. Ralph of Caen certainly argued that long-standing 
tensions between the Provenyals and the southern Italian Normans 
flared up during the second siege of Antioch, noting that ' the 
quarrel [between these groups] did not decrease, but rather 
increased' after the invention of the Holy Lance. But this section 
of Ralph's text, detailing the Lance's story and Bohemond's 
supposed scepticism about its authenticity, is problematic because 
it summarized events and attitudes from a much wider 
chronological period. Ralph alluded to the dispute over tenure of 
specific sectors of Antioch, which flared up in the winter of 
109811 099 and described the ordeal by fire undergone by Peter 
Bartholomew in April 1099. Given Bohemond's own expressions 
of apparent support for the Holy Lance in the princes' letter of II 
September 1098, it seems probable that Ralph of Caen used 
hindsight and a blurring of chronology to exaggerate Bohemond's 
initial doubts and to amplify the extent of inter-Latin rivalry in 
June 1098 33 
One might also suggest that the Franks had somehow garnered 
intelligence indicating that Kerbogha' s army was itself beset by 
factionalism and therefore elected to delay battle in the hope that 
the Muslim siege might falter and disintegrate. But no primary 
evidence survives to support this theory, and it is rendered even 
more improbable by other factors. Kerbogha' s decision to adopt a 
slower encirclement siege strategy from 14 June onwards and his 
disposition of troops on 28 June are indicative of a general 
confidence in the cohesive unity of the army he had put in the 
field 34 This suggests that the fractures which ultimately shattered 
the effectiveness of his forces on 28 June remained unheralded, 
even to the Muslims, before that date35 
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It seems, therefore, that the First Crusaders were not prevented 
from seeking battle immediately after 14 June; nor could any 
delay be characterised as having been militarily expedient.36 If the 
Franks were, in truth, directly inspired by the discovery of the 
Holy Lance to seek a confrontation with Kerbogha then how can 
their prevarication be explained? In fact, the balance of evidence 
suggests that the advent of this relic, spiritually powerful as it may 
have been, was not enough to send the crusaders marching out of 
the gates of Antioch to fight a battle against overwhelming odds. 
This would mean that the Lance's discovery was not the decisive 
moment of Antioch's second siege, much less a watershed in the 
progress of the entire crusade. If this is so, then we are still left 
with two questions: What happened in the two weeks between 14 
June and the battle of Antioch? And what eventually prompted the 
crusaders to risk everything in an open confrontation with 
Kerbogha on 28 June? 
We should consider the possibility that desperation, not hope, 
shaped the course of events in this period. The Franks must have 
felt increasingly isolated in the latter stages of the second siege of 
Antioch. Just before their capture of Antioch on 3 June 1098, their 
one-time commander-in-chief, Stephen count of Blois, had 
removed himself to the nearby port of Alexandretta, apparently 
due to illness. The anonymous author of Gesta Francorum 
described how the crusaders looked, in vain, to his return 
throughout the second siege: 'When we were shut up in the city, 
lacking help to save us, we waited each day for him to bring us 
aid,]' Stephen had actually fled northern Syria and set off across 
Asia Minor, only to encounter the Franks' other main hope for 
reinforcement, the Greeks, at Philomelium. 
It seems very likely that, since reaching Antioch in October 
1097, the crusaders had been anticipating the arrival of later waves 
of Latin crusaders and Byzantine forces, perhaps under the 
command of the Emperor Alexius I Comnenus himself. The 
combination of what John France called the' Armenian strategy' 
and the seizure of the Belen Pass appear to indicate that the Franks 
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were hoping to channel this manpower from Asia Minor to 
Antioch as rapidly and efficiently as possible by opening the 
Cilician passage.38 By early June 1098, Alexius had indeed 
advanced with his army from Constantinople to Philomelium, 
capitalising upon the damage done by the crusaders to the power 
of the Seljuq sultanate of Iconium to reassert Byzantine control 
over south-western Asia Minor3 9 According to Anna Comnena, 
Alexius' daughter and biographer, the emperor was preparing to 
march to Antioch when the arrival of Stephen of Blois and news 
of the crusaders' supposed defeat prompted a dramatic reversal of 
strategy. Prioritising the security of his empire, on or around 20 
June Alexius initiated a full-scale retreat to Constantinople.40 It is 
far from certain that news of the emperor's decision reached 
Antioch before 28 June. Admittedly Albert of Aachen recorded 
that it did, describing how ' the terrible report of the emperor 
turning back and his army dispersing sped across the ramparts of 
Antioch and afflicted the pilgrims' hearts with ~reat grief and 
shook much of the boldness from their spirits.' 1 But Albert's 
chronology is not always reliable so he may have been mistaken. 
A message from Philomelium would have had to travel to Antioch 
at near-record speed to have had a direct bearing upon the 
Frankish princes ' decision to seek battle with Kerbogha. Even so, 
as the second siege of Antioch entered its third week, the 
crusaders must have begun to realise that they could not rely upon 
the arrival of reinforcements for their salvation. 
If this assessment of the evidence is accurate, then the First 
Crusaders were in a state of desperation by late June 1098. Their 
spirits had been temporarily rallied by the discovery of the Holy 
Lance, but this, by itself, had not been enough to prompt decisive 
action. By 24 June, surrounded by a numerically superior enemy, 
ravaged by starvation and seemingly deserted by the Greeks, the 
Latins appear to have been on the verge of disaster. With this 
perspective in mind, we must turn to an intriguing and largely 
neglected episode, one that might lead us to reconsider the 
accepted narrative of the First Crusade. 
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Peter the Hermit's embassy 
Towards the end of the second siege of Antioch, the crusader 
princes dispatched two envoys to their enemy Kerbogha. The men 
chosen as ambassadors were Peter the Hermit, the charismatic 
crusade preacher who had attempted to desert in January 1098, 
and an otherwise unknown interpreter named Herluin. We can be 
fairly certain that this seemingly incongruous episode actually 
occurred. The fact that it was noted in such a range of eyewitness 
and near-contemporary primary sources, many of which were 
drawn from independent stem'mas of information, suggests that 
this was an actual event rather than a piece of imaginary epic 
chanson styling.42 
The dating of the embassy is, however, more problematical. [n 
modern scholarship it has, on the basis of Heinrich Hagenmeyer's 
'Chronologie de Ie Premiere Croisade', been consistently dated to 
27 June 1098, that is, the day before the battle of Antioch 4 3 This 
is significant because, if accurate, it would indicate that the 
crusaders had made a firm decision to fight Kerbogha even before 
the envoys were dispatched, as the Franks are widely reported to 
have undergone three days of fasting and spiritual preparation 
prior to the battle.44 But Hagenmeyer's conclusions deserve 
reconsideration. He cited Anselm of Ribemont's second letter to 
Manasses as his chief authority for the date of 27 June, but 
Anselm's testimony actually indicates that the embassy was 
dispatched on 28 June. Anselm went on to depict the crusaders 
undergoing limited spiritual preparations, including confession 
and mass, the timescale of which are unclear, before the battle 
itself commenced.45 It seems, in fact, that Hagenmeyer chose the 
date of 27 June as a compromise between Anselm ' s account and 
the evidence provided by other eyewitnesses. The anonymous 
author of the Gesla Francorum clearly stated that the Latins 
dispatched the embassy and then, upon Peter the Hermit's return, 
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underwent three days of spiritual purging before marching out of 
Antioch on 28 June.46 The Lucca letter confirmed the observance 
of three days of religious ritual before the battle, but failed to 
mention the embassy, while in Raymond of Aguilers' account the 
em bassy and the battle appear to be separated by a few days but 
the details are unclear.47 On this basis, the embassy to Kerbogha 
could potentially be dated anywhere from 24 to the 28 June. At the 
very least, the alternative date of 24 June is just as likely as that 
suggested by Hagenmeyer, and would mean that the crusaders had 
not necessarily decided to fight their Muslim besiegers before 
Peter the Hermit was sent to parley. 
There is, in addition, considerable disagreement among the 
primary sources with regard to what actually happened during this 
embassy. Latin eyewitnesses present in Antioch in June 1098 
recorded that Peter the Hermit was sent to Kerbogha to deliver a 
defiant ultimatum. Raymond of Aguilers provided a succinct 
account, noting that the princes 'sent Peter the Hermit to 
Kerbogha, atabeg of Mosul, with orders that he give up the siege 
of Antioch because that city was under the jurisdiction of St Peter 
and the Christians', but that the Muslim general flatly refused.48 
The Gesta Francorum contains a rather more elaborate version of 
the same events, embellished by reported speech and containing 
the additional detail that both sides encouraged the other to 
convert. Although there was, in all likelihood, a textual 
relationship between these two sources, their testimony is broadly 
corroborated by Anselm of Ribemont's second letter to 
Manasses.49 This group of sources does not really present Peter 
the Hermit's embassy as a serious attempt at negotiation, but 
rather as an act of intense bravado in the face of enormous odds. 
In reality, hard-bitten men of war like Bohemond of Taranto 
would surely have known that, given Kerbogha's significant 
numerical superiority, Latin intimidation was exceptionally 
unlikely to succeed. Perhaps, then, the whole affair can simply be 
explained as a propaganda exercise targeted more at bolstering 
Frankish spirits than testing Muslim resolve5o 
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There were, however, other explanations for Peter the 
Hermit's embassy. Contemporary or near-contemporary Latins 
who were not in Antioch in June 1098, like Fulcher of Chartres 
and Ralph of Caen, believed that Peter was sent to offer Kerbogha 
a trial by champions. According to Fulcher, Peter suggested that 
'war could be waged by five or ten or twenty or by 100 soldiers 
chosen from each side, so that with not all fighting at the same 
time, such a great number would not die, and the party which 
defeated the other would take the city and realm without 
dispute ' .51 If this was indeed the nature of Peter's message then, 
once again, the Latins cannot have held out much hope of it being 
accepted. Kerbogha had no reason to renounce his overwhelming 
strength in numbers and, as Fulcher went on to admit, he refused 
the supposed offer out of hand. 52 
In fact, if we accept the testimony of the Latin sources, we 
must conclude that in late June 1098 the princes were not 
engaging in genuine diplomacy. We might then rationalise Peter's 
embassy as an exercise in intelligence gathering, as an act of 
morale-boosting defiance, or simply as a delaying tactic. It should 
be stressed, however, that all of these seemingly more realistic 
explanations are purely speculative, having no specific basis in 
primary evidence. 
However, a range of non-Latin, and thus potentially less 
partisan, sources indicate that the embassy to Kerbogha may have 
had a more serious diplomatic purpose. Admittedly, this evidence 
comes from writers who were divorced from events by both space 
and time, but it nonetheless merits consideration. The Armenian 
Christian historian, Matthew of Edessa, writing in the 1130s, 
described what he believed happened in June 1098: 
[Kerbogha's) army arrived [at Antioch). Being seven 
times larger than the Frankish force, their troops violently 
besieged and harassed it. Then the Franks became 
threatened with a famine, because provisions in the city 
had long become exhausted. More and more hard-
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pressed, they resolved to obtain from Kerbogha a promise 
of amnesty on condition that they deliver the city into his 
hands and return to their own country. 53 
A later Arabic source appears to substantiate this version of 
events. The Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Athir, who was based in 
Mosul and wrote a wide-ranging general history of the Islamic 
world up to 1231 in the first quarter of the thirteenth century based 
upon a range of earlier Arabic accounts, offered the following 
description of. the second siege of Antioch: 
After taking Antioch, the Franks camped there for twelve 
days without food. The wealthy ate their horses and the 
poor ate carrion and leaves from the trees. Their leaders, 
faced with this situation, wrote to Kerbogha to ask for 
safe conduct through his territory, but he refused, saying: 
"You will have to fight your way out".54 
Anna Comnena also alluded to the possibility of a negotiated 
Latin surrender, recording that in June 1098 '[the Latins] had 
given up hope of saving themselves and were planning to desert 
the fortifications [of Antioch] and hand them over to the enemy, 
intent only on preserving their own lives by running away'. 55 This 
information was, of course, noted in the context of explaining and 
excusing Alexius' decision to retreat from Philomelium. 
These three pieces of evidence have been largely ignored by 
modern historians. Believing that the Franks, empowered by the 
invention of the Holy Lance, had already committed to battle, they 
have rejected out of hand any notion that the leaders of the First 
Crusade might have sought terms of surrender. But with the two 
week delay between 14 and 28 June taken into account and the 
impact of the Holy Lance downgraded, this material may be 
viewed in a different light. If we wish to make sense of the 
decision to send Peter the Hermit as an envoy to Kerbogha, we 
mllst at least acknowledge the possibility that he was dispatched to 
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explore the option of a negotiated end to the second siege of 
Antioch. This notion does at least have a clear, albeit not 
conclusively authoritative, evidentiary basis.56 
On 24 June the Latin princes found themselves trapped within 
Antioch, facing seemingly inevitable defeat. Even the anonymous 
author of the Gesta Francorum conceded that, at the same time as 
Peter the Hermit was being sent to Kerbogha, 'our men did not 
know what to do, for they were afraid, being caught between two 
perils, the torments of hunger and the fear of the Turks,57 The 
crusade's central goal was the recovery of Jerusalem, not the 
conquest of Antioch and it is conceivable that, in this darkest hour, 
the expedition's leaders were prepared to give up one city in 
pursuit of the other. A negotiated surrender that enabled them to 
leave northern Syria - perhaps through retreat to Cilicia or Edessa 
- might well have afpealed, promising the renewed possibility of 
reaching Palestine.' 
When Kerbogha, from a position of seemingly overwhelming 
military strength, refused to countenance anything short of 
unconditional surrender, the possibility of a diplomatic solution to 
Antioch's second siege evaporated. The crusaders were then 
presented with a stark choice: fight or face death or captivity. 
Drawing upon the memories of eyewitnesses, Albert of Aachen 
offered us a glimpse of this predicament when he wrote that: 
The Christian people were besieged and began to suffer 
from shortage of supplies and lack of bread. They did not 
have the strength to suffer these things any longer, so 
great and small consulted together, saying it was better to 
die in battle than to perish from so cruel a famine, 
growinf weaker from day to day until overcome by 
death.5 
To date, historians have been overly confident in their 
reconstructions of the second siege of Antioch. In reality, unless 
new evidence comes to light, we will never be able to piece 
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together its exact progress. There are enough grounds to suggest 
that we should at least consider a rather intriguing alternative 
version of the accepted narrative for late June 1098: one in which 
the unearthing of Holy Lance was not the pivotal moment in the 
second siege of Antioch; where the relic buoyed crusader morale, 
but did not prompt an outbreak of ecstatic piety, sending the 
crusaders running into battle; and, where the Frankish leaders, 
seemingly paralysed by fear between 14 and 24 June, seriously 
contemplated a negotiated surrender. It is true that, in the last days 
of June, the crusaders decided to confront Kerbogha's forces in 
open battle. But we should perhaps categorise this not as act of 
blind faith, but rather as an act of desperation . 
The memory of the Holy Lance 
There is, of course, an obvious problem with this thesis. If the 
Holy Lance had a limited effect and the crusader princes actually 
contemplated surrender, then how do we account for the testimony 
of the surviving Latin primary sources, most especially those like 
the letters written by Anselm of Ribemont or the citizens of 
Lucca, that were composed during the course of the crusade and 
might thus be expected to be less subject to hindsight? Why do 
they proclaim the significance of the Lance, while offering little or 
no hint of a projected withdrawal from northern Syria? 
One could suggest that the true nature of the negotiation with 
Kerbogha was a closely guarded secret to which only the ruling 
elite were privy. This might not have been entirely impossible -
after all, during the Third Crusade, Richard the Lionheart appears 
to have successfully concealed much of the nature and extent of 
his negotiations with the Ayyubids from the Latin world - but this 
explanation still is not wholly convincing, not least because the 
First Crusade was led not by a single individual, but by a council 
of potentates.60 Are we likewise to imagine that a conspiracy of 
silence and deception operated across all our Latin sources? That 
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men such as Anselm of Ribemont and Raymond of Aguilers 
consciously inflated the impact of the Holy Lance, perhaps even 
suppressed an attempted surrender, all in order to present the 
crusade as an unfalteringly heroic enterprise empowered by pious 
spirituality? 
It is more likely that the Latin primary sources for the second 
siege of Antioch were subject to organic rather than systematic 
forces of construction. The story of the Holy Lance is, in fact, an 
exemplar of a much wider process; one in which the events of the 
crusading expedition, experienced by thousands of individuals, 
were ordered by the collectivisation of memory and then 
coalesced into recorded 'history'. In all probability, the 
recollections of June 1098 were shaped not by a conspiracy to 
deceive, but by a desire to interpret and understand events and, 
most significantly, by a need to explain the 'miracle ' of victory on 
28 June. Modern historians have long looked to military science to 
account for the Franks' defeat of Kerbogha's numerically superior 
force in the Battle of Antioch.61 But to the First Crusaders, this 
was unquestionably an act of God. They looked to the miraculous 
and the divine to explain how, from a state of bedraggled 
exhaustion, they had achieved a triumphant success. 
Among the crusaders who marched out of Antioch 's Bridge 
Gate on 28 June was Raymond of Aguilers, ardent supporter of 
the Cult of the Holy Lance, bearing, according to his own 
testimony, the relic in his own hands. The primary sources record 
an array of different miracles occurring on that day, some, 
although certainly not all, of which were associated with the 
Lance. Raymond described how no one was wounded in his 
vicinity 'because of the protection of the Holy Lance '. Albert of 
Aachen believed that, at the start of the battle, Kerbogha was 
actually blinded and paralysed by the sight of the Lance. 
Meanwhile, the anonymous author of the Gesta Francorum 
detailed the appearance of an army of ghostly soldiers, led by SS 
George, Demetrius and Mecurius, that fought alongside the 
Franks.62 
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It was in this environment, in the aftermath of the battle of 
Antioch, that the Cult of the Holy Lance truly began to take hold. 
The agency of this relic helped to explain how and why events had 
played out as they had. And, during the summer of 1098, the 
formation of a shared and agreed memory of what had happened 
that June seems to have begun to take hold, eventually enshrining 
the trans formative effect of the Lance's discovery. It is, of course, 
significant in this regard that we possess not a single shred of 
evidence about the events of June 1098 that was composed before 
the confrontation with Kerbogha. 
This process of reconfiguration and coalescence of memory 
can be clearly observed in the history of Bishop Adhemar of Le 
Puy 's relationship with the Holy Lance, a relationship which also 
highlights the Lance's role in the struggle to lead the First 
Crusade. There can be little doubt that in June 1098 Adhemar 
harboured significant doubts about the relic's authenticity; it was, 
after all, Raymond of Aguilers, the Lance's advocate, who 
recorded this scepticism. Raymond also made it clear that it was 
he, and not the bishop, who personally bore the relic into the battle 
of Antioch. But already, in the Lucca letter - which, as we have 
noted, was likely based on Bruno's recollections from Jul?, I 098-
it was stated that Adhemar carried the Lance on 28 June.6 
The revision of Adhemar's attitude to the Lance deepened and 
accelerated after his death on I August 1098.64 The prime movers 
in this process were Peter Bartholomew and Raymond of 
Toulouse. The latter presented himself as the secular patron of the 
Lance's burgeoning cult and consequently as leader of the 
crusade, all with the visionary's complicit support. Indeed, after 
the relic was uncovered Peter apparently went so far as to 
proclaim that St Andrew had appeared to him say ing: '''Behold 
God gave the Lance to the count, in fact, had reserved it for him 
alone throughout the ages, and also made him leader of the 
crusaders on the condition of his devotion to God.",65 
With Peter Bartholomew's popularity and influence rising in 
tandem with that of the relic he had uncovered, his continuing 
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visions became increasingly vocal in their support of Raymond's 
political cause. The reconfiguration of Adhemar of Le Puy's 
'memory' was a cornerstone of this process. Just two days after 
the bishop 's death, Peter Bartholomew proclaimed that he had 
experienced his first visitation from Adhemar's spirit and the 
process of appropriating his legacy began. The papal legate was 
buried in the Basilica of St Peter, within the very hole in which the 
Holy Lance had been discovered. The physical fusion of the two 
cults - a masterstroke of manipulation - was reinforced once Peter 
began relaying the bishop's 'words' from beyond the grave, 
revealing that Adhemar now recognised the authenticity of the 
Lance and that his soul had been severely punished for the sin of 
having doubted the relic, suffering whipping and burning.66 With 
this volte-face in his stance on the Holy Lance, Adhemar's spirit 
became the ideal mouthpiece for the promotion of Count 
Raymond's political ambitions. The bishop soon ' declared ' that 
his former vassals should transfer their allegiance to the count and 
that Raymond should be authorised to hand-pick the crusade's 
. . II d 67 new splntua ea er. 
Between the summer of 1098 and spring 1099, the count's 
prestige was boosted by his position as patron of the Cult of the 
Holy Lance and the support of Peter Bartholomew. In this period, 
Raymond became the driving force behind the continued progress 
of the crusade, although his authority was never entirely 
uncontested . Ultimately, however, his hopes of reaching 
Jerusalem as the expedition's overall secular commander were 
foiled. Distracted by his own territorial ambitions in Syria and the 
Lebanon, damaged by Peter Bartholomew's decision to attempt to 
prove the veracity of his visions through an ordeal by fire at Arqa 
- a feat which culminated in Peter's death - Count Raymond was, 
in the end, forced to share command of the siege of the Holy City 
with Godfrey of Bouillon 68 It is worth noting that, in the 
aftermath of Peter's ordeal and with the Cult of the Lance 
faltering, Raymond sought to bolster his position by sending for 
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the relic of True Cross once carried by Adhemar of Le Puy which 
was then being held in Latakia.69 
In the years that followed the First Crusade's conquest of 
Jerusalem, the details of Adhemar's attitude to and relationship 
with the Holy Lance gradually blurred. The Gesta Francorum was 
instrumental in this process. Its straightforward account of events, 
which contained no reference to the bishop's initial doubts, nor to 
his volte-face post mortem, nor indeed to Peter Bartholomew's 
ordeal, became the template for many of the narrative histories of 
the crusade written in the first decades of twelfth century. By this 
time, two interconnected 'facts' about Adhemar appear to have 
entered collective memory: that he had supported the authenticity 
of the Lance; and that he had carried the relic in the battle of 
Antioch on 28 June 1098. 
While from a 'factual' perspective we would argue that by the 
standards of critical method our 'best' evidence indicates that 
Adhemar was not a patron of the Lance's cult, this is, in many 
ways, far less important than understanding what medieval 
contemporaries believed: what was widely held to be true about 
the lance in the central Middle Ages; and how it entered the 
crusading mythology disseminated throughout twelfth-century 
Europe, shaping crusading thought and practice. 
A succession of texts indicate that the tradition of Adhemar's 
relationship with the Lance was solidified and expanded. Perhaps 
the most significant of these was the account of the First Crusade 
written by Robert the Monk in c. 1107. [n this, the most widely 
disseminated Historia of the expedition which appears to have 
taken the Gesla Francorum as its base text, Adhemar was clearly 
stated to have carried the Lance.7o At about the same time, Guibert 
of Nogent was composing his own account of the crusade, the 
Gesta Dei per Francos. Like Robert, Guibert was a Benedictine 
monk, one who is now widely acknowledged to have had a 
particularly inquisitive intellect and to have been unusually 
willing to question the authenticity of sacred relics. Of all the 
contemporaries who wrote about the Holy Lance, we might expect 
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Guibert to be the most sceptical. But he had absorbed the tradition 
that Adhemar carried the Lance at Antioch and therefore, 
assuming that the bishop had adjudged the relic to be authentic, 
accepted it without questionJ 1 
As the twelfth century progressed new details were added to 
the story. Caffaro recorded that the ghostly army which appeared 
on the 28 June lowered its standards in honour of the Holy Lance 
borne by Adhemar, while the Chanson d 'Antioche actually 
depicted the bishop pleading with Raf,'mond of Toulouse to be 
permitted to carry the relic into battle. 2 Wi lliam of Tyre, writing 
his magisterial history of the crusades and the Latin East between 
the mid-eleven-seventies and the mid-eleven-eighties, reflected 
the now-enshrined myths regarding the episode of the Holy Lance, 
while adding a further refinement. He detailed the rapturous 
reaction to the relic's discovery and depicted Adhemar in 
possession of the relic at the battle of Antioch but, perhaps to 
validate the bishop' s apparent credulity, he also adjusted Peter 
Bartholomew's social standing. Raymond of Aguilers had 
described the visionary as a peasant. To Guibert of No gent, he had 
been a soldier. But in William's text, he now became a cleric. 73 It 
is interesting, and not a little alarming, to note that Peter' s new-
found ecclesiastical status was reiterated in as recent and as 
authoritative a volume as Jean Richard's The Crusades, c. 1071-
c.129l.74 
There can be no question that Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy's 
views of, and relationship to, the Holy Lance underwent a 
significant transformation in the century that followed the First 
Crusade. Similar forces - the coalescence of memory, the gradual 
simplification of complex series of events, the conscious or 
unconscious manipulation of narrative record - may have shaped 
contemporary understanding and recollection of the second siege 
of Antioch, the reception to the Holy Lance, the embassy to 
Kerbogha and the battle of Antioch. At the very least, we should 
acknowledge that historians have, to date, been far too confident 
of their ability accurately to reconstruct the events at Antioch in 
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June 1098. The 'traditional' narrative which currently holds sway 
in modern historiography could still be accurate, but there are 
other ways of reading the evidence. It is possible that the 
discovery of the Holy Lance on 14 June did not inspire an 
overwhelming outburst of piety, nor an empowering renewal of 
the conviction that the crusade was operating with divine sanction; 
that the relic did not directly prompt the decision to engage 
Kerbogha in battle, and that the leaders of the crusade actually 
explored the possibility of a negotiated surrender and retreat from 
Antioch on or around 24 June; and that, with all other options 
exhausted, trapped in the city with their strength faltering, the 
Franks decided to purify their souls, place their trust in God and 
march out of the Bridge Gate of Antioch on 28 June to what most 
believed would be their deaths. 
This alternative version of events does not unmake our wider 
understanding of the First Crusade. But it does confront us with a 
subtly different species of crusader - one for whom spiritual faith 
was still an extremely powerful motivating force, but perhaps not 
an all-conquering, unshakeable inspiration. 
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